There are six sections in this article. In section 1, I summarize views on discourse as a facet of globalization in the academic literature, and then introduce an approach based upon a version of 'critical discourse analysis' (CDA) and 'cultural political economy.' In section 2, I discuss di¤erent strategies of globalization (and regionalization) emanating from governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the di¤erent discourses that constitute elements of these strategies. In section 3, I discuss how processes of globalization impact upon specific spatial 'entities' (nation-states, cities, regions, etc.) in terms of the idea of 're-scaling,' i.e., changing relations in processes, relationships, practices, and so forth between local, national, and international (including 'global') scales. I focus here upon the national scale in its relation to the global scale and the scale of international regions (in particular, the process of 'European integration'). In section 4, I deal with the media and mediation. In section 5, I discuss people's ordinary experience of globalization, and its implications for and e¤ects upon their lives. Section 6 deals with war and terrorism.
Let me begin from two very general and abstract formulations of the highly complex sets of changes which have been recently referred to as 'globalization': 'a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions . . . generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power' (Held et al. 1999) ; 'complex connectivity . . . the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependencies that characterize modern social life' (Tomlinson 1999: 2) . These 'flows, ' 'networks,' and 'interconnections' are generally seen as very diverse in character, and including: flows of goods and money and international financial and trading networks in the economic field; inter-governmental networks and interdependencies and interactions and interconnections between international agencies such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and government agencies at national and regional levels; the mobility of people as migrants, tourists, or members of commercial or governmental organizations; flows of images and representations and interactions through contemporary media and forms of technology; and so forth.
We can make three initial observations about language or what I shall prefer to refer to as 'discourse' 1 in processes of globalization in this sense. First, that the networks, connectivities, and interactions crucially include, and one might say depend upon, particular forms (or 'genres') of communication that are specialized for trans-national and interregional interaction, such as the genres of global news networks; and that the 'flows' include flows of representations, narratives, and discourses, such as neoliberal economic discourse. In that sense, it is partly discourse that is globalizing and globalized. Second, that it is important to make a distinction between actual processes and tendencies of globalization, and representations or discourses of globalization. We cannot get away from the fact that globalization is both a set of changes that are actually happening in the world (though what the set includes is highly controversial), and a word -'globalization' -which has quite recently become prominent in the ways in which such changes are represented. But this is a simplification, because the word 'globalization' is used in various senses within more complex discourses, which are partly characterized by distinctive vocabularies in which 'globalization' is related in particular ways to other 'keywords' such as 'modernization,' 'democracy,' 'markets,' 'free trade,' 'flexibility,' 'liberalization,' 'security,' 'terrorism,' 'cosmopolitanism,' and so forth; and these discourses are more than vocabularies -they have certain lexico-grammatical features (e.g., does 'globalization' figure as a causal agent in material processes, as in 'globalization opens up new markets'?), certain narratives, certain forms of argumentation, and so forth. 2 Third, having made this distinction, it is equally important to consider what the relationship is between actual processes of globalization and representations of globalization. In broad terms, we can say that representations and discourses of globalization do not merely construe processes and tendencies of globalization that are happening independently (though they do so construe them, for instance, in political rhetoric), they also contribute to creating and shaping actual processes of globalization, though in complex and contingent ways.
A vast amount has been said and written about globalization, and this in itself makes it a di‰cult and confusing issue to write about. It is made more confusing if we do not distinguish what has been said by whom, and di¤erentiate the main 'voices' within all this talk and writing. I shall distinguish five: academic research and analysis; government agencies in a broad sense -national governments, political leaders, agencies that are a part of national governments, agencies of international governance such as the UN or the WTO, and so forth; nongovernmental agencies, again in a very inclusive sense including, for instance, business corporations, charities such as Oxfam, campaigning or monitoring organizations such as Greenpeace or CorpWatch; the media (television, radio, press, etc.); and people as citizens or members of various sorts of community -people acting out their 'ordinary' lives. These voices are not fully discrete: there are flows between them -for instance, academic analysis directly or indirectly contributes to the language of governmental and non-governmental agencies, and academic analysis itself draws from management literature. And of course di¤eren-tiating just five major sources inevitably simplifies the plethora of actual voices.
The six sections of the paper partly correspond to these diverse 'voices.' In section 1, I summarize views on discourse as a facet of globalization in the academic literature, and then summarize my own approach, which is based upon a version of 'critical discourse analysis' (CDA) that is envisaged as a component of a 'cultural' political economy. In section 2, I discuss di¤erent strategies of globalization (and regionalization) emanating from governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the di¤erent discourses that constitute elements of these strategies. In section 3, I discuss how processes of globalization impact upon specific spatial 'entities' (nation-states, cities, regions, etc.) in terms of the idea of 're-scaling,' i.e., changing relations in processes, relationships, practices, and so forth between local, national, and international (including 'global') scales. I focus here upon the national scale in its relation to the global scale and the scale of international regions (in particular, the process of 'European integration'). In section 4, I deal with the media and mediation. In section 5, I discuss people's ordinary experience of globalization, and its implications for and e¤ects upon their lives.
Section 6 deals with war and terrorism. A discussion of this issue may seem surprising in a paper on the theme of language and globalization, so let me briefly explain it, and in so doing clarify the particular stance I am taking on globalization and its discourse facet. I shall focus in section 2 on what Steger (2005) has called 'globalism' (see also Saul 2005) , which is the strategy and discourse (and 'story') of globalization which has become most influential, has had most e¤ect on actual processes of change. The key feature of 'globalism' as a discourse is that it construes (and aims to construct, or more contentiously hijack) the actual processes of globalization in a neo-liberal way -as centrally the liberalization and global integration of markets. Latterly, the 'war on terror' has been construed as a necessary element in defending and advancing 'globalization' in this reductive sense (and, the claim is, human progress). I focus on 'globalism' not because it exhausts globalization -it does not, globalization is a much bigger phenomenon -nor because 'globalism' is the only current discourse of globalization (it is not) but because it is the discourse that has become hegemonic.
Views on discourse as a facet of globalization
There are various attempts to classify the vast and diverse academic literature on globalization, including the well-known di¤erentiation between 'hyperglobalist,' 'sceptical,' and 'transformationalist' positions in Held et al. (1999; see also Hay and Marsh 2000; Cameron and Palan 2004) . But I want to suggest a classification more suited to the purpose of this paper, based upon di¤erent views of discourse as a facet of globalization. Four main positions can be distinguished: objectivism, rhetoricism, ideologism, and social constructivism. Objectivism treats globalization as simply objective fact, which discourse may either illuminate or obscure, represent or misrepresent (the position basically adopted for instance in Held et al. 1999) . Rhetoricism focuses on how various discourses of globalization are used for instance by politicians to persuade publics to accept certain (sometimes unpalatable) policies (see, for example, Hay and Rosamond 1992) . Ideologism focuses upon how particular discourses of globalization systematically contribute to the legitimation of a particular global order which incorporates asymmetrical relations of power such as those between and within countries (e.g., Steger 2005) . Social constructivism 3 recognizes the socially constructed character of social life in general and forms of globalization in particular, and sees discourse as potentially having significant causal e¤ects in processes of social construction (e.g., Cameron and Palan 2004) . Let me stress that these are recognizable general positions, which particular authors often use in combination -for instance although Steger's emphasis is on ideology, he also discusses the socially constructive force of discourses.
From this classification of positions we can identify five general claims about discourse as a facet of globalization: -discourse can represent globalization, giving people information about it and contributing to their understanding of it -discourse can misrepresent and mystify globalization, giving a confusing and misleading impression of it -discourse can be used rhetorically to project a particular view of globalization that can justify or legitimize the actions, policies or strategies of particular (usually powerful) social agencies and agents -discourse can contribute to the constitution, dissemination, and reproduction of ideologies, which can also be seen as forms of mystification, but have a crucial systemic function is sustaining a particular form of globalization and the (unequal and unjust) power relations which are built into it -discourse can generate imaginary representations of how the world will be or should be within strategies for change that, if they achieve hegemony, can be operationalized to transform these imaginaries into realities, i.e., particular actual forms of globalization.
The fifth claim is the strongest one, and it is the claim I have committed myself to above. But this does not mean that we should reject the others -on the contrary, there is truth in all of them. What is generally lacking in the existing literature however is a systematic approach to theorizing and analyzing discourse as a facet of globalization that can show these various e¤ects of discourse and the relationship between them, and help explain them. My approach to discourse is a particular version of CDA (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2000a Fairclough , 2000b Fairclough , 2003 Fairclough , 2005a Fairclough , 2005b Fairclough, Jessop, and Sayer 2004) , but I think it is fruitful in researching discourse as a facet of globalization to work with a 'cultural' political economy (Jessop 2004; Jessop and Sum 2001) that incorporates the former. Political economy di¤ers from classical economics in asserting that economic systems and economic changes are politically conditioned and embedded (Polanyi 1944) . Cultural political economy asserts that economic and political 'objects' in the widest sense (including economic systems, economic organizations, the division of labor, the state, forms of management, and governance) are socially constructed, are coconstructions of subjects and objects (and hence also culturally conditioned and embedded), and are in part e¤ects of discourse. What I have called actual processes and tendencies of globalization are highly complex, diverse, uneven, multidimensional (economic, political, social, cultural, ecological , and so forth), and incapable of being fully controlled by any human intervention. Nevertheless, as in any actual scenario, strategies are developed to regulate, direct, and control elements of these real processes, which may if successful inflect and partly redirect their overall trajectory, and such strategies centrally include discourses that represent and narrate past and present processes and imagine possible futures, possible economic (social, political, cultural) orders. Even if as in the case of globalism the primary objectives of the strategy are economic, the noneconomic conditioning and embedding of economic systems, objects, and processes that I have alluded to means that a strategy is only likely to succeed if it aims for general social and cultural change.
In situations of disorientation and crisis such as that associated with the di‰culties of post-war Fordist economic systems and the Keynsian welfare state (Jessop 2002 ) that preceded the emergence of globalism, one finds a proliferation of discourses imagining alternative forms of organization for economy, state, and society. One central question for cultural political economy is the mechanisms and processes that connect variation, selection, and retention, i.e., how certain of the discourses that are circulating are selected, and how they come to be retained (or institutionalized), and thereby come to be capable of having constitutive e¤ects on real economic, political, and social processes. This is a question one can ask about the discourse of globalism -how did it come to be selected from a range of alternatives and retained (institutionalized)? How did it come to shape actual processes and tendencies of globalization, or in other words, come to be operationalized and implemented? Operationalization points to the dialectical character of relations within discourse and between discourse and other elements or moments of the social. A discourse is operationalized through being enacted in ways of acting and interacting that themselves have a partially discursive character in that they include genres (ways of interacting communicatively), for instance, in ways of working, managing, governing, or conducting politics; through being inculcated in ways of being, social, and personal identities, which also have a partly discursive character in that they include styles (ways of being in their specifically communicative or discursive aspect, as opposed to their bodily or somatic aspects), for instance, the identities of workers, entrepreneurs, managers, politicians, teachers; and through being materialized physically in technologies, infrastructures, architectures, and so forth. From a discourse analytical perspective a successfully operationalized strategy constitutes a new order of discourse (Fairclough 1992) , i.e., a new structured (though flexibly structured) configuration of discourses, genres, and styles. Globalism, neo-liberal globalization, is in part an order of discourse in this sense. It is important to add however that the hegemony of such a strategy, discourse, and operationalized social order can never be complete -because actual processes always exceed even successfully constructed construals of them, because there are always alternative and even counter-strategies and discourses, and because any successfully reconstituted reality is a contradictory and crisisprone reality (Jessop 2004 ).
Discourses of globalization
'Globalism' is a discourse of globalization that represents it in reductive neoliberal economic terms within a strategy to inflect actual processes of globalization in that direction. Steger (2005) identifies six core claims of 'globalism' (as well as providing arguments against all of them):
-Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets -Globalization is inevitable and irreversible -Nobody is in charge of globalization -Globalization benefits everyone -Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world -Globalization requires a war on terror
The first claim is the most crucial one, and most central to the question of how this particular discourse came to be selected and retained from the range of alternatives, especially in what it assumes as a general and therefore globally applicable truth, that the most e¤ective form of capitalist economy is one based upon 'liberalized' markets. The plausibility and resonance of this assumption rest upon what have been pretty successfully established as facts about the post second-world-war socio-economic order, and especially the 'fact' that markets are self-regulating and interference by states (as this history is claimed to have shown) are economically counter-productive and damaging. There is, of course, the contrary 'fact' that unregulated markets have been shown to produce chaotic and disastrous e¤ects (Polanyi 1944) , but in the aftermath of the economic troubles of the 1970s powerful agents and agencies were unreceptive to it. For in addition to a perceived objective plausibility in real experience, market liberalization gained the support of the most powerful states (the U.S. and Britain were forerunners) and influential politicians, international agencies that these states e¤ectively control (the World Bank, IMF, WTO, OECD, etc.), private corporations, and many other agents and agencies. Steger describes globalism as a 'story' (or narrative), a discourse, and an ideology. The term 'ideology' is not inappropriate: globalism can be seen as having created a space for unconstrained and highly profitable action on the part of the corporations of the most powerful countries on earth, especially the U.S., on the basis of a claim that markets work benignly without external regulation which the crises of the late 1990s (in East Asia, Latin America, and Russia) have shown to be false. Yet the strategy and discourse have proved relatively resilient and capable of accommodating certain concessions to regulation without major change. It has also gained influence within the European Union despite continuing commitment to some form (if a 'modernized' and arguably weakened one) of the European Social Model.
Epistemologically, discourses are abstract entities established on the basis of repetition and recurrence over time and in diverse social sites, but ontologically they appear in the concrete form of particular texts. One contribution that CDA can make to (cultural) political economic analysis is methods for analysing texts that illuminate their contribution to strategies, discourses, and their operationalization and implementation, as well as their recontextualization in di¤erent places (e.g., countries, regions) and di¤erent fields of social life, and their adaptation to changing events and circumstances. CDA in itself cannot however tell us which texts are significant within the constitutive e¤ects of discourse on social life -that requires institutional and historical forms of analysis.
I shall illustrate the contribution of textual analysis in the case of a speech (Eizenstat 1999 ) whose significance arises from the standing of the speaker (U.S. undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat) and the context of crisis for globalism within which it was delivered and which it addresses (it was delivered in the wake of the Asian economic collapse in the late 1990s), constituting a response by the U.S. government to crises that threatened the strategy they supported. In essence, Eizenstat acknowledges the threat while arguing that 'globalization' must not be abandoned, that the crisis was largely due to flaws in the countries a¤ected, and that international help must be given to remedying them, and thus restoring confidence in the capacity of the system to deliver on its promises. The speech is clearly globalist, and it illustrates some of the central globalist claims identified by Steger: that 'globalization' benefits everyone ('By any measure, globalization is a net benefit to the United States and the world. In an increasingly globalized and interdependent economy, the quest for prosperity is the opposite of a zero sum game'), that it is inevitable and irreversible ('Globalization is an inevitable element of our lives. We cannot stop it anymore than we can stop the waves from crashing on the shore'), and that it strengthens democracy. Yet there is evidence in apparent incoherencies within the speech that its attempt to justify continuing adherence to a globalist strategy in the face of stark evidence of the failures of globalism and 'fears' of a consequential 'backlash against globalization,' puts the discourse of globalism under strain. For example, the quotation above to illustrate the claimed inevitability and irreversibility of 'globalization' comes from the following paragraph in the o‰cial transcript:
Globalization is an inevitable element of our lives. We cannot stop it anymore than we can stop the waves from crashing on the shore. The arguments in support of trade liberalization and open markets are strong ones -they have been made by many of you and we must not be afraid to engage those with whom we respectfully disagree.
This appears to be an argument, with a claim in the first sentence that seems to be supported by two grounds in the second and third sentences. But it is incoherent because the two grounds are in contradiction -if globalization is analogous to a natural phenomenon in its inevitability, how can it be open to argument, as the second ground implies? To put the problem in di¤erent terms, we have three sentences that are combined in the transcript within a paragraph, which implies coherent relations of meaning between them that are di‰cult to see. The di‰culty lies in the meaning of 'globalization,' a word that is much used in the text but in a way that confuses the 'forces' of globalization that the U.S. strategy for 'trade liberalization and open markets' is designed to 'harness,' and the (globalist) strategy itself. Here, as elsewhere in the speech, an implicit equivalence is constructed between 'globalization' and 'trade liberalization and open markets.' In the following paragraph, the implicit equivalence is between 'globalization' and 'dramatic economic liberalization':
In short, the financial crisis has exacerbated fears in developing countries and could fuel a backlash against globalization. Indeed, the optimistic notion only two years ago that the world was adopting dramatic economic liberalization as a model for economic and political development is under challenge.
We might counter Eizenstat's argument with the claim that the feared 'backlash' is surely against globalist strategy, not against globalization as a set of real processes. And for the following extract, with the claim that the 'undeniable risks' surely come from globalist strategy and policies, not from the real processes of globalization, and that it is by no means 'fruitless' to attempt to stop the former.
The world must neither resort to protectionist measures in a fruitless attempt to stop globalization nor should we ignore its undeniable risks.
In short, Eisenstat's apologia for globalism in the face of evidence and widespread recognition of its manifest failures is built upon obscuring the di¤erence between globalization as a set of real processes and tendencies, and one favored strategy among a number of conceivable and potentially viable alternatives for regulating, controlling, and directing a globalizing world. If Eizenstat's speech illustrates the capacity of the strategy and discourse of 'globalism' to accommodate failures and crises without fundamental change, though not without incoherence and contradiction, there is no shortage of alternative and competing strategies and discourses that, in some cases, especially since the crises of the late 1990's, constitute a challenge to the hegemony of 'globalism.' The Malaysian government withdrew from the neo-liberal 'global economy' after the Asian crisis and has pursued its own counter-strategy with some considerable success (bin Mohamad 2002) . Other Asian governments also have their own strategies for and discourses of globalization. In the European Union, especially countries with a strong tradition of social democracy (such as Sweden) seek to combine international competitiveness with strong social policies. And some international agencies have pushed for alternatives to globalism (e.g., ECLAC 2002). There are then many non-governmental organizations which produced alternative and competing strategies, including those which reflect the 'limits to growth' perspective such as the Green Party in the U.K. (Green Party 2005) . Globalism is still the most influential strategy, but it has had to some extent to come to terms with others, though U.S. policy especially since September 11, 2001 has favored aggressive unilateralism over accommodation, shifting from what Steger (2005) calls 'soft power' (reliance on persuasion and inducements) to 'hard power' (using economic and military force to compel compliance) in pursuit of a version of globalism that is more nakedly selfinterested.
Re-scaling
I shall now shift my focus from strategies and discourses of globalization to the question of how processes of globalization impact upon specific spatial 'entities' (nation-states, cities, regions, etc.), how they become globalized. I shall draw upon Jessop's view (2002) of globalization as the constitution of new scales of social action, interaction, and exchange (not only the global scale, but also, for instance, the 'macro-regional' scale of the European Union or the North American Free Trade Area, and the scale of 'cross-border regions'), and of new relations between different scales. The spatial entity I focus on here is the nation-state, taking Romania, one of the 'post-communist' states of eastern Europe, as an ex-ample. The globalization of a country like Romania can be viewed as a matter of its 're-scaling,' its incorporation into new relations of scale.
The strategy of globalism constitutes from this perspective a strategy to constitute a global scale of action, interaction, and exchange. As I argued above, the objective is a global scale that is narrowly constrained and one might say reduced in terms of the forms of action, interaction, and exchange it entails, to, in Eizenstat's words, 'trade liberalization and open markets,' though the political and cultural embedding of economies that I discussed earlier mean that the success of the strategy is conditional upon a more general transformation of social relations, institutions, values, attitudes, and identities. Success also requires the dissemination of the strategy and discourse within innumerable spatial entities including nation-states like Romania, and their operationalization and implementation. There are also simultaneously strategies and discourses to constitute macro-regional scales such as the European scale. When we begin the examine these strategies in detail, it becomes clear that although it may be possible to identify overall strategies oriented to both the global and the macro-regional scales, these are 'nodal' strategies around which a multiplicity of more focused strategies are clustered. So, in the case of the European Union, a nodal strategy was defined by the Lisbon Council of 2000 (to make the EU 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledgebased economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion'), but there are many more focused strategies for constituting a European scale (or 'space' or 'area') of higher education, lifelong learning, competitiveness, social inclusion, and so forth.
These strategies and discourses, as well as many others, are 'recontextualized' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) in spatial entities at various scales, including nation-states like Romania. Recontextualization is not a simple matter of the spread of strategies and discourses to new contexts. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) argue for seeing recontextualization as a dialectical process of external 'colonization' by and internal 'appropriation' of recontextualized elements, which are appropriated within an internal field (or rather complex set of fields) of strategic diversity, contestation and struggle. Romania is said to be a country in 'transition' from a centrally-planned economy and one-party state to a market economy and western parliamentary democracy, and it is even after fifteen years of 'transition' a highly complex not to say chaotic and disorganized mixture of old and new. The actual impact on particular nation-states of recontextualized strategies and discourses is likely to be variable, unpredictable, and potentially quite di¤erent from what strategists may have envisaged. Is, for instance, 'trade liberalization and open markets' an accurate way of describing Romania fifteen years after what was e¤ec-tively a globalist strategy for transition (what came to be known as the 'Washington Consensus') was defined for it as for other post-communist countries? Partly, yes -but Romania is also characterized by a still significant if rapidly diminishing state economic sector, a substantial 'black economy,' and the existence of clientelist relations between the state, political parties, public administration, and private business that make the word 'open' highly problematic and produce massive corruption and the exorbitant self-enrichment of an elite.
Let me try to make these general observations about re-scaling more concrete by referring to a particular example, the EU's strategy to constitute a European Area of Higher Education (i.e., a European scale in higher education) that would incorporate candidates for EU accession like Romania as well as other countries on borders of the EU as well as EU members, and the recontextualization of the EU strategy and discourse in Romania. EU strategy is based around the 'Bologna process,' which grew out of the Bologna Declaration (2001). Its aim is to achieve 'greater compatibility and comparability of the systems of higher education' in the region in both undergraduate and graduate degrees, in order to 'promote citizens' mobility and employability' and 'the international competitiveness of the European system of higher education.' The latter objective indicates that the process of higher educational reform is actually global, not just European -the Bologna process is a European response to global processes of change, which involve the emergence of a competitive international market in higher education (as part of the moves towards a General Agreement on Trade in Services within the WTO), in the context of the perceived increasing economic importance of higher education in the 'knowledge-based economy' that the EU is committed to, and fears about the EU's lack of competitiveness with the U.S. and East Asia. The specific targets include standardization of degree structures in terms of the duration of undergraduate and graduate degrees and the number of credits attaching to each unit, the development of comparable criteria and methodologies for quality assurance, a 'Diploma Supplement' that would make qualifications more easily readable and comparable, and promoting student and sta¤ mobility within European countries.
The discourse associated with the Bologna strategy is internally complex, and we can better refer to it as a nodal discourse that is constituted as a configuration of discourses, including, for instance, the discourses of 'competitiveness' and 'quality.' Moreover, the Bologna process is an incremental one in which the strategy and discourse have been elaborated over time, at regular biannual meetings of Ministers of Education. For Romania, the selection of this discourse was a selection that made itself, given government policy to achieve accession to the EU, and given the relations of power entailed (for successful accession, involvement is required in the construction of European scales in various domains). One part of measures to secure retention of the discourse, as well as its operationalization and implementation, has been legislation -a new Law on the Organization of University Studies was passed in 2004, requiring universities to implement the specific targets detailed above. The justification for the new law provided by the government in Parliament was that reorganization would 'eliminate excessive specialization,' contribute to the 'development of professions which are short of specialized and economically and culturally necessary personnel,' contribute to 'the development of new qualifications related to current needs and . . . the labor market,' and be in line with 'the dynamics of the labor market at national, European, and international level.' So the Government's interest was more or less entirely economic, and there were no references to other legitimations that have been prominent in the Bologna documentation such as student mobility or European culture and identity. The new system was put into operation from autumn 2005.
But a promised law on 'quality assurance' has not yet emerged, and it is quality assurance I want to focus on to illustrate the complexities and uncertainties of recontextualization and re-scaling in Romania. There is a general public cynicism about government discourse and legislation that is constantly expressed in public discourse, including the mass media, in terms of a gap between words and realities. In this case as in others, it is with operationalization and implementation that the problems begin. To put a complex issue in a simple way, there is considerable scepticism about whether Romanian universities have, or can come to have in the near future, the institutional characteristics which are prerequisites for the Bologna reforms to be actually implemented. Quality assurance is a particularly good illustration of the problems.
The European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA) has developed 'European standards for internal and external quality assurance, and for external quality assurance agencies,' which were approved at the Bergen meeting of Ministers of Education in 2005. The methodology for quality assurance is centered upon 'selfexamination' and 'self-evaluation' -the principle that 'providers of higher education have the primary responsibility for the quality of their provision and its assurance' (ENQA 2005). They should establish an inclusive 'culture of quality' (including students, academic sta¤, administrative sta¤, and other 'stakeholders') that recognizes the importance of quality and seeks its continuous enhancement. The role of external quality assurance is to ensure that this process of internal quality assurance is adequate. In internal quality assurance, 'institutions should have formal mechanisms for the approval, periodic review and monitoring of their programmes and awards,' 'students should be assessed using published criteria, regulations and procedures which are applied consistently,' 'institutions should have ways of satisfying themselves that sta¤ involved with the teaching of students are qualified and competent to do so,' that 'the resources available for the support of student learning are adequate and appropriate' and that they 'collect, analyze, and use relevant information for the e¤ective management of their programmes of study and other activities. ' The operationalization of this discourse of quality assurance entails its enactment through the constitution and institutionalization of new procedures ('mechanisms') that amount to a new set of interconnected genres (on genre 'chains' or 'networks,' see Fairclough 2003) , such as genres for sta¤ self-evaluation and student evaluation of courses. It also entails, as the idea of a 'culture of quality' suggests, its inculcation in new ways of being, new institutional identities that substantively include new styles. The idea of a 'culture' of quality and an ongoing concern to improve quality through self-monitoring and self-assessment implies changes in 'the way people perceive themselves in relation to their work, to one another and to themselves,' changes in 'professional, collegial and personal identity' (Shore and Wright 2000) . Thus, systems of quality assurance entail profound changes in institutions, their social relationships and practices and the identities of their members, which could fruitfully be researched with CDA as changes in their orders of discourse. They entail social relationships that are open and relatively egalitarian, practices that are transparent and subject to e¤ective institutional regulation, and people who are professionally committed to the institution and well-disposed to continuous learning. Consider, for example, sta¤ appraisal. The sta¤ appraisal procedure I am familiar with in one British university is transparently defined as a network of genres: a written self-evaluative report by the appraisee, which is the basis for an interview between appraiser and appraisee so designed as to achieve consensus on an account and evaluation of the appraiser's work in the preceding period, a plan for the next period, and means for fulfilling this plan. The appraisal interview is the basis for a report written by the appraiser and agreed by the appraisee that is confidential to both of them and the Head of Department. For such a procedure to work successfully, the sort of prerequisites I have indicated need to be in place.
The general situation in Romanian universities (there are di¤erences and exceptions) is that institutional regulation of practices is poor and opaque, social relations are highly hierarchical and predominantly clientelist, and the distribution of goods is controlled in often arbitrary and personalized ways by a professorial elite, and people in some cases cynically seek to maximize their own interests, and in most cases are demoralized and alienated by abysmal salaries and conditions and what they perceive as an under-resourced and unjust system. There is already a national council set up for external quality assurance, and internal quality assurance systems are in a more or less advanced stage of preparation in individual universities. Public universities are still subject to a substantial measure of ministerial control, so a quality assurance system and new procedures will emerge. The optimistic view is that systems and procedures will contribute to the profound transformations I have indicated, the pessimistic and perhaps more realistic view is that existing social relations and interests are so entrenched that lip-service will be paid to forms of quality assurance with little substance, and certainly nothing resembling a 'culture of quality.' If the latter happens, there will be new genres and styles -on paper, but probably not in practice. 4 Quality assurance is just one example of a new technology and discourse of governance that is based upon a principle of 'self-management,' 'monitoring' and 'assessment' combined with external 'audit,' 'rituals of verification.' 'Where audit is applied to public institutions -medical, legal, educational -the state's overt concern may be less to impose dayto-day direction than to ensure that internal controls, in the form of monitoring techniques, are in place' (Strathern 2000) . The technology/ discourse is closely associated with the idea of the 'accountability' of public institutions. These developments in governance fall under the general rubric of 'new public management,' which is consistent with neo-liberal principles of converting public services into competitive markets (Rose 1999) . On the face of it, institutions are 'empowered' to make their own way in the market free of bureaucratic control, but their autonomy is largely illusory, because they are subject to 'audits' that monitor how effective their mechanisms and procedures are for 'assuring' standards of 'quality' that are imposed upon them. The 'open method of coordination' adopted by the EU can be seen as essentially the same technology and discourse of governance. The Bologna strategy thus overlaps with a strategy and discourse to constitute a European scale of governance, and the problems I have indicated for Romania in operationalizing the former are compounded as the latter is applied to a variety of institutions.
Let me just add that university reform in Romania as in other countries gives people working in universities a sense of being caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. While few people would wish to defend the existing system, few people are attracted by the subordination of universities to economic demands and interests or the university system turning into just another competitive international market.
Media and mediation
Cultural political economy asserts that political economies are subject to cultural conditions, and are culturally embedded. In contemporary societies, mass media are the predominant social field in the creation of these cultural conditions -in the constitution of the public knowledge and information, beliefs, values, and attitudes that are necessary for establishing and sustaining economic, social, and political systems and orders. Changes in the international political economy of communication have been an important factor for the relative success of globalist strategy and discourse. The emergence of a global communications industry, dominated by powerful transnational corporations such as Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, is itself a significant part of the emergence of a neoliberal 'global economy.' The role of these corporations in global political economy is twofold: first, they have provided the infrastructure (hardware and software) that has enabled changes in the pattern of production; second, they are 'the major purveyors of news, information, entertainment and knowledge about the world in general' (Wilkin 2001: 126) . They are the main source of views and ideas, of a sense of what is right and what is possible, and the main providers of credibility and legitimacy for the powers that be. They contribute to the dissemination of globalist discourse, claims, and assumptions, and of the values, attitudes, and identities that are conditions for the successful implementation of globalism, on the basis of an intimate relationship between these corporations and other sectors of business, the public relations industry, governments in the most powerful states, and other agencies. This is not to say that the media as a whole are a mere echo-chamber for globalism. Influential independent newspapers and broadcasting still exist in many countries, and they have in many cases played a crucial role in challenging aspects of globalism as well as orchestrating opposition to war (especially in the case of Iraq). But the independent role of the media as a 'fourth estate' fulfilling a public service role, providing accurate and dispassionate information, and, where necessary, exposure and criticism of social ills, is being progressively undermined as the transnational corporations become dominant in the media field internationally.
With respect to news, one can see the partial emergence of a global news agenda whose coverage depends upon a common resource of news agency reports and film, addressed to an increasingly global audience, and producing globalized representations and meanings around particular events. This is particularly clear in the case of news items which top the global agenda, such as natural disasters like the tsunami of December 2004, terrorist attacks like '9/11,' wars (most recently the Iraq war), the death of prominent individuals (such as the Pope), or major international political events such as meetings of G8 or the WTO. Meetings of such organizations have become occasions for protest demonstrations by people who are opposed to the way that globalism is actually working with respect to such matters as international debt, terms of trade between rich and poor states, and so forth, and I want to take the coverage of such representations as an example.
Such demonstrations have come to be increasingly seen and treated as primarily problems of law-and-order, and predominant media representations in countries across the world represent them with a focus upon anticipated or actual violence rather than on the major political issues that are at stake, according to what we can call an established narrative schema or template that is applied to new events as they occur. An example of the focus on anticipated violence in the media build-up to such events is a report in the British Daily Telegraph on June 12, 2005 about the G8 meeting in Edinburgh in July. The headline was 'Police prepare to make thousands of arrests at G8,' and the article began as follows:
The Army is preparing barracks and military bases in Scotland for use as holding camps if, as police expect, thousands of protesters are arrested during the G8 summit of world leaders next month.
The decision to earmark sites where protesters may be held follows warnings from European police forces and intelligence o‰cials that foreign anarchists have already entered Britain and are plotting to disrupt the meeting, to be held at Gleneagles, the luxury hotel and resort in Perthshire, Scotland.
Senior detectives have told The Sunday Telegraph that more than 50 dedicated troublemakers with criminal records have slipped into the country, before the imposition of stringent security measures at airports, ferry terminals and on the Eurostar train service in the immediate run-up to the summit.
World leaders including Tony Blair and presidents Putin, Bush and Chirac will attend the three-day meeting and police are straining to protect them and keep protesters at bay. There are fears that anarchists from across Europe will mingle with anti-capitalism campaigners in and around Edinburgh, which is expected to be the focal point of demonstrations against the international financial system. Their numbers are likely to be swollen by campaigners for African debt relief, who have been urged to descend on the Scottish capital by Bob Geldof.
The political objectives of the planned demonstration are alluded to ('demonstrations against the international financial system,' 'campaigners for African debt relief ') but parenthetically and in the most general terms. The focus of the story is on preparations for 'disruption' (the term attributed to the police) against the background of evidence that 'dedicated troublemakers' (with, moreover, 'criminal records') and 'anarchists' will be joining the demonstration and are 'plotting' (anarchists are, of course, are wont to 'plot') to disrupt them.
Reports of the actual events of and around the G8 meeting were again dominated by violence. What is striking is that very similar reports appeared across the world, from Europe and America to China. On July 6, CNN, the trans-national news channel with the biggest international circulation, used the headline 'G8 protesters clash with police' (notice the implicit agency and responsibility attributed to the protestors in this formulation, in comparison with 'G8 protestors and police clash'). The story began as follows:
EDINBURGH, Scotland -Protesters clashed with police, smashing car windows and throwing rocks, just hours before the world's eight richest nations were set to open their annual meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland.
More than 100 activists, many wearing bandanas and hoods, emerged from a makeshift camp in Stirling early Wednesday morning, The Associated Press reported, one day after clashes sent 100 protesters to court.
A spokesman for Central Scotland Police confirmed to AP that o‰cers had come under attack. Protesters could be seen smashing a police van.
There had been two arrests but no reported injuries, a police spokeswoman told Reuters.
The report did go on to why people were demonstrating, but the focus was on the violence. Needless to say, if the increasingly global character of protest can be countered by an increasingly global message that protestors are violent anarchists or criminals, globalist strategy stands to benefit. Other accounts of such events outside the mainstream media (see, for instance, www.indymedia.co.uk) have accused the latter of focusing upon what were in relative terms minor aspects of the demonstrations, of reporting violence rather than the substantive content of the demonstrations, and of ignoring the ways in which heavy-handed policing was provoking clashes.
Globals and locals
Globalized media agendas dominated by a globalized communications industry assume considerable importance given what Tomlinson (1999) calls the 'deterritorialization' of local lives whereby 'globalization lifts cultural life out of its hitherto close connection with physical locality.' People's experience is increasingly a combination of unmediated experience through direct contact with others in their communities, and mediated experience especially through television. Their mediated experience gives them contact with ways of life, information, practices, and values (and in discourse analytical terms with discourses, genres, and styles) that transcend their unmediated experience. Positively, it vastly increases their access to potential resources, but insofar as agendas, perspectives, and values (and discourses, genres, and styles) are controlled and limited in the ways I have suggested, it exposes them to the strategies and meanings favored by the powerful.
Yet the relationship between mediated and unmediated experience is a complex one, and the comments I made in the section on re-scaling about the complexities, uncertainties, and unpredictability of recontextualization apply also here. There can be tensions between them that a¤ect media reception, so that the interpretation of media messages, images, and representations may be highly diverse. And while people may add elements of their mediated experience to their resources for living their own lives, these may be hybridized with local resources in diverse and unpredictable ways (Tomlinson 1999) . This includes 'interdiscursive hybridity' (Fairclough 1992) , the emergence of new hybrid discourses, genres, and styles out of the dynamic relationships and tensions between mediated and unmediated experience. A trap that some academic analysis of globalization falls into is treating globalization only in terms of the actions and strategies of agents and 'players' who are dominant on global, macro-regional or national scales, and assuming the local impacts of global processes and tendencies, rather than recognizing the need for locality-based analysis to establish these (Burawoy et al. 2000) .
One issue is the strategies of survival that people develop to deal with the e¤ects of globalization, such as unemployment. In the following extract (from MacDonald 1994) we have three unemployed people in the North East of England talking on the theme of 'fiddly jobs' -working (illegally) while claiming social security benefits.
Phil: There's enough around. All you have to do is to go into any pub or club, that's where the work is. The person you mentioned he probably just sits around watching the telly. To get a job round here you've got to go around and ask people.
Danny: Most of it is who you know. You've got no chance of getting a job in the Job Center . . . You go out to the pub. People who go to the pub go to work.
Stephen: He [the 'hirer and firer'] just shows his face in 'The Rose Tree' or 'The Gate' and people jump and ask him for work. When I was working there I've seen him just drive o¤ in his van around the pubs and he'll come back with another twenty men to work, an hour later. No one asks any questions.
It's a matter of us being cheaper. It's definitely easier than having a lot of lads taken on permanently. It would cost them more to put them on the books or pay them o¤. It's just the flexibility. You're just there for when the jobs come up, and he (the 'hirer and firer') will come and get you when you're needed. You need to be on the dole to be able to do that. Otherwise you'd be sitting there for half the year with no work and no money at all Jordan (1996) argues that the 'socially excluded' develop their own often e¤ective social capital and social networks to survive -this is evident in this extract, as also is the way such emergent practices are discoursally constructed and sustained through contemporary proverbs -'People who go to the pub go to work.' Jordan also argues that survival strategies are a perfectly rational response to the conditions people find themselves in, based upon a perception of how the new form of capitalism works that is widely recognized but outside o‰cial public discourse. We can read Stephen here as giving a formulation of such a rationale: black labor is part of the 'flexibility' of the new capitalism, but it is so undependable that only people on social security ('the dole') can do it. Notice the word 'flexibility' -Stephen is giving voice to neo-liberal economic discourse, but ironically incorporating it into his rationale for black labor as an alternative to the o‰cially approved course of moving from welfare into poorly paid work.
But the issue goes beyond strategies of survival. 'Global ethnographers' (Burawoy 1999; Burawoy and Verdery 1999) have shown a sort of 'globalization from below' in which people in particular localities develop their own global networks as resources for building and promoting strategies on local issues, drawing upon their mediated experience. Gille (2000) for example has investigated a controversy over the building of a hazardous waste incinerator in a rural area of Hungary that divided the local communities and brought them into alliances with national and international agencies and organizations. Those in favor of the incinerator sought to ally themselves with the global incinerator industry and to justify the project in terms of EU policy on the disposal of hazardous waste, as well as appealing to anti-Romani sentiment by representing the incinerator as a way to 'keep the Gypsies out' of the area. Those opposed to the incinerator sought allies in the Western Green movement, representing the incinerator as part of an EU policy to shift the disposal of western hazardous waste to the East. What such examples illustrate is local people actively constructing global links and in so doing developing their own discursive resources, appropriating on both sides discourses, narratives and forms of argumentation from the West. This provides an important corrective to the idea of flows of strategies and discourses from West to East which people are passively subjected to.
War and terrorism
The U.S. shift from 'soft' to 'hard' power I alluded to above is associated with the rise to power of 'neo-conservatism,' particularly when G. W. Bush became President. Neo-conservatism has a continuing commitment to neo-liberalism and globalism, but combined with a willingness to use the economic and military power of the U.S., unilaterally if necessary, to preserve U.S. global hegemony, which is seen as conditional upon the successful defence and extension of the globalist strategy. The clearest expression of this combination of strategic change and continuity is the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 (Chomsky 2003 Rice interprets the New York attacks as an 'existential threat' to U.S. 'security' not from other powerful states but from 'terrorists' and 'weak or failed states,' a new threat that demands a new strategy. America will 'use its position of unparalleled strength and influence to create a balance of power that favors freedom,' and this will include 'military power.'
We will break up terror networks, hold to account nations that harbour terrorists, and confront aggressive tyrants holding or seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that might be passed to terrorist allies. These are all di¤erent faces of the same evil . . . the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully materialized. Pre-emption is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats.
To support this strategy, the U.S. 'will build and maintain . . . military forces that are beyond challenge . . . and seek to dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.' Such a development is more remote than in the past however because 'the world's great centers of power are united by common interests, common dangers, and . . . common values' and 'share a broad commitment to democracy, the rule of law, a market-based economy, and open trade.' The U.S. 'will fight poverty, disease, and oppression because it is the right thing to do -and the smart thing to do. We have seen how poor states can become weak or even failed states, vulnerable to hijacking by terrorist networks.' But 'development assistance . . . will only be available to countries that work to govern justly, invest in the health and education of their people, and encourage economic liberty . . . values must be a vital part of our relationship with other countries.' 'We reject the condescending view . . . that Muslims somehow do not share the desire to be free. The celebrations we saw on the streets of Kabul . . . proved otherwise.' 'We do not seek to impose democracy on others, we seek only to help create conditions in which people can claim a freer future for themselves.' Finally, 'we have the ability to forge a twenty-first century that lives up to our hopes . . . only if we (exercise) our influence in the service of our ideals, and not just ourselves. ' The change in military circumstances that Rice refers to can be seen as the emerging predominance of 'irregular warfare,' which is fundamentally about 'weak forces learning how to fight strong,' and is a comprehensible response to prolonged domination by the West over the rest (Saul 2005) . In reducing this to 'terrorism' and 'tyrants,' and adopting an aggressive military strategy, the U.S. government is arguably failing to address basic issues of (in)justice that underlie the proliferation of irregular warfare, and its own responsibility for injustices. 'Terrorism' is, of course, a much contested category -for neo-conservatives it conflates di¤erent forms of violence such as September 11 itself, the Palestinian intifada, the Chechyen war, and the resistance to American and British occupation of Iraq, without apparently including the 'state terrorism' practised by U.S. governments themselves in Indo-China or by the Israeli government in Palestine (Honderich 2003) . The now routine portrayal of the opposition as 'evil' indicates an important characteristic of neo-conservatism -its links with Christian fundamentalism. The National Strategy includes what Rice misleadingly calls a strategy of 'pre-emption' -to attack nations that are 'seeking' (on what evidence, and in whose view?) nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that 'might' be passed to 'terrorist allies,' and 'before threats have fully materialized.' This is not 'pre-emptive' war, which might be justified in international law, but 'preventive' war, which is illegal (Chomsky 2003) . There is a problem of how to legitimize the U.S. claim to permanent hegemony, and the solution is broadly to claim the U.S. is a force for good that operates on the basis of 'values.' It seeks a balance of power that favors 'freedom,' a value that few would dissociate themselves from. But the neo-conservative use of the word systematically blurs the distinction between 'free market' and political 'freedom,' and treats them as one and them same thing. The desire for 'freedom' is assumed to be universal, shared by Muslims as well as others. And, in the words of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 'values and interests merge': when it come to fighting poverty, disease, and oppression, what is 'right' is also 'smart,' though aid is conditional upon conformity with values which include the globalist value of 'encouraging economic liberty ' (Duffield 2001) .
This neo-conservative version of globalist strategy and discourse (which includes the discourse of the 'war on terror, ' Jackson 2005) has been e¤ectively disseminated internationally with the assistance of the global communications industry. In terms of the five positions I distinguished earlier on discourse as a facet of globalization, what I have said above suggests that the discourse of the 'war on terror' is primarily ideological, e¤ectively legitimizing a strategy to preserve and extend U.S. global (and globalist) hegemony for large sections of the global public, including, for instance, the publics of post-communist countries such as Romania. It has succeeded in marginalizing counter-discourses, but without silencing them, and indeed they are gaining strength even in the U.S. itself and Britain. The discourse is also e¤ective rhetorically in persuading many people to accept restrictions on civil liberties. But it also has constructive e¤ects, including an international restructuring of regimes and apparatuses of security, and the convergence of policies on development with security policies (Du‰eld 2001) .
Conclusion
I have adopted a specific, and necessarily highly selective, approach to the very big issue of how language relates to processes of globalization. Among many omissions there is the question of languages, and particularly the question of 'global English.' For instance, the recontextualization of the discourse of globalism and many other discourses that are germane to the re-scaling of Romania also entails the borrowing of a great deal of English vocabulary. To illustrate, readers will recognize the italicized words in the following extract from a statement by the Romanian Minister of Communications and Information Technology at a National Conference on 'Outsourcing' in November 2005, which are either English borrowings or existing Romanian words used in the senses they have in the recontextualized discourse:
Outsourcingul este un domeniu de succes al ITandC -ului romanesc. Competitia pe aceasta piata a devenit una foarte stransa, Romania fiind nevoita sa concureze in satul global nu doar cu tarile europene, ci si cu cele din Orientul Indepartat sau America Latina. Doar o strategie de marketing si de branding bine structurata si gandita pe termen mediu ne va ajuta sa ne situam pe un loc fruntas in aceasta competitie globala.
My approach is based upon the use of CDA in transdisciplinary research on social change that has characterized my recent research and is reflected in the References. In particular, I have used a version of cultural political economy that incorporates a version of CDA. The main point that emerges from this approach is that all the highly complex and diverse contemporary processes of globalization inherently have a language dimension, because globalization and indeed social change in general are processes involving dialectical relations between diverse social elements or 'moments,' always including discourse. This has been partly recognized as I have indicated in the social scientific literature of globalization, though little of this research truly does justice to the language dimension, and students of language have a great deal to o¤er social scientific research in terms of helping it to achieve a more satisfactory treatment of discourse. 5 Notes 1. I shall use the term 'discourse' rather than language, in the sense in which it is used in 'critical discourse analysis' (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) . In my approach to critical discourse analysis, 'discourse' is in a broad sense the semiotic element or moment of the social, which subsumes both language and other semiotic forms such as visual images, and which is dialectically related to other moments of the social (Fairclough 2003) . Discourse in this abstract sense includes but should be distinguished from 'discourses' (a count noun), which are di¤erent ways of representing aspects of reality (e.g., there are di¤erent political discourses). 2. It also raises an epistemological problem: what I have referred to as 'actual processes and tendencies of globalization' are themselves also representations, so we are faced with evaluating di¤erent representations in terms of how adequate they are to realities. I shall not address this thorny problem in detail. I shall assume that it is di‰cult to solve but not unsolvable -that di¤erent representations can indeed be evaluated in terms of their relative 'practical adequacy' (Sayer 2000) , by reference to social scientific evidence of various sorts on the extent to which what they suggest or imply about social reality actually happens in social reality. 3. I use 'social constructivism' here for the widespread recognition within social science of the socially constructed character of the social world, and not for the particular philosophy of science that goes under that name, which 'in its strong form claims that objects or referents of knowledge are nothing more than social constructions' (Sayer 2000) . Like Sayer, I would reject this position, while recognizing the socially constructed character of the social world.
4. I do not wish to suggest that the institutional obstacles to e¤ective quality assurance systems I have described are exclusively a problem for Romania or other post-communist countries, they also exist to a greater or lesser degree in at least some western European countries. 5. Readers should note that the analysis for this paper was carried out several years before its publication, in 2005. Significant changes, for instance in the 're-scaling' of Romania and the 'war on terror,' have taken place since.
